Cellular Wiretapping, Surveillance and Phone Tap News

Two Strange Deaths in European Wiretapping Scandal

Just after noon on Friday, July 21, Adamo Bove -- head of security at Telecom Italia, the country's largest telecommunications firm -- told his wife he had some errands to run as he left their Naples apartment. Hours later, police found his car parked atop a freeway overpass. Bove's body lay on the pavement some 100 feet below.

Bove was a master at detecting hidden phone networks. Recently, at the direction of Milan prosecutors, he'd used mobile phone records to trace how a "Special Removal Unit" composed of CIA and SISMI (the Italian CIA) agents abducted Abu Omar, an Egyptian cleric, and flew him to Cairo where he was tortured. The Omar kidnapping and the alleged involvement of 26 CIA agents, whom prosecutors seek to arrest and extradite, electrified Italian media. U.S. media noted the story, then dropped it.

The first Italian press reports after Bove's death said the 42-year-old had committed suicide. Bove, according to unnamed sources, was depressed about his imminent indictment by Milan prosecutors. But prosecutors immediately, and uncharacteristically, set the record straight: Bove was not a target; in fact, he was prosecutors' chief source. Bove, prosecutors said, was helping them investigate his own bosses, who were orchestrating an illegal wiretapping bureau and the destruction of incriminating digital evidence. One Telecom executive had already been forced out when he was caught conducting these illicit operations, as well as selling intercepted information to a business intelligence firm.

About 16 months earlier, in March of 2005, Costas Tsalikidis, a 38-year-old software engineer for Vodaphone in Greece had just discovered a highly sophisticated bug embedded in the company's mobile network. The spyware eavesdropped on the prime minister's and other top officials' cell phone calls; it even monitored the car phone of Greece's secret service chief. Others bugged included civil rights activists, the head of Greece's "Stop the War" coalition, journalists and Arab businessmen based in Athens. All the wiretapping began about two months before the Olympics were hosted by Greece in August 2004, according to a subsequent investigation by the Greek authorities.

Tsalikidis, according to friends and family, was excited about his work and was looking forward to marrying his longtime girlfriend. But on March 9, 2005, his elderly mother found him hanging from a white rope tied to pipes outside of his apartment bathroom. His limp feet dangled a mere three inches above the floor. His death was ruled a suicide; he, like Adamo Bove, left no suicide note.

The next day, Vodaphone's top executive in Greece reported to the prime minister that unknown outsiders had illicitly eavesdropped on top government officials. Before making his report, however, the CEO had the spyware destroyed, even though this destroyed the evidence as well.

Investigations into the alleged suicides of both Adamo Bove and Costas Tsalikidis raise questions about more than the suspicious circumstances of their deaths. They point to politicized, illegal intelligence structures that rely upon cooperative business executives. European prosecutors and journalists probing these spying networks have revealed that:

The Vodaphone eavesdropping was transmitted in real time via four antennae located near the U.S. embassy in Athens, according to an 11-month Greek government investigation. Some of these transmissions were sent to a phone in Laurel, Md., near America's National Security Agency.

According to Ta Nea, a Greek newspaper, Vodaphone's CEO privately told the Greek government that the bugging culprits were "U.S. agents." Because Greece's prime minister feared domestic protests and a diplomatic war with the United States, he ordered the Vodafone CEO to withhold this conclusion from his own authorities investigating the case.

In both the Italian and Greek cases, the spyware was much more deeply embedded and clever than anything either phone company had seen before. Its creation required highly experienced engineers and expensive laboratories where the software could be subjected to the stresses of a national telephone system. Greek investigators concluded that the Vodaphone spyware was created outside of Greece.

Once placed, the spyware could have vast reach since most host companies are merging their Internet, mobile telephone and fixed-line operations onto a single platform.

Germany's Federal Intelligence Service, BND, recently snooped on investigative journalists. According to parliamentary investigations, the spying may have been carried out using the United States's secretive Bad Aibling base in the Bavarian Alps, which houses the American global eavesdropping program dubbed Echelon.

Were the two alleged suicides more than an eerie coincidence? A few media in Italy -- La Stampa, Dagospia and Feltrinelli, among others -- have noted the unsettling parallels. But so far no journalists have been able to overcome the investigative hurdles posed by two entirely different criminal inquiry systems united only by two prime ministers not eager to provoke the White House's wrath. In the United States, where massive eavesdropping programs have operated since 9/11, investigators, reporters and members of Congress have not explored whether those responsible for these spying operations may be using them for partisan purposes or economic gain.

As more troubling revelations come out of Europe, it may become more difficult to ignore how easily spying programs can be hijacked for illegitimate purposes. The brave soul who pursues this line of inquiry, however, should fear for his or her life.

Jeffrey Klein is a founding editor of Mother Jones. Paolo Pontoniere is a New America Media European commentator.

Dishonest phone worker could have passed on royal info

A dishonest telephone company employee could have passed on voicemails and text messages from Royal staff to journalists, a security expert said today. He said a 'less than honest' worker at a telephone exchange could easily have passed information to journalists but added it was unlikely actual mobile phone conversations could have been monitored because of the difficulties involved.It follows the arrest yesterday (tue) of News of the World journalist Clive Goodman and two unnamed men by police investigating phone tapping allegations made by staff at Clarence House.Michael Marks, a director of spycatcheronline company which supplies surveillance and counter-surveillance equipment around the world, said there were various ways of monitoring communications.He said: "I have no idea what sort of bug may have been used, but from reports I understand mobile GSM phones could be involved. Because they are digital and encrypted, they are very difficult to monitor."With old analogue phones it was easy to just buy a scanning device, but not any more."

One way to monitor them is if there is somebody working in the exchange who is less than honest and passes on text messages and voicemail messages."Another is to use equipment that the government uses to monitor GSM phones in anti-terror and drug operations.

These cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and should only be sold to governments, although there are always disreputable companies."In this case the phone always has to be within 300 to 500 metres of the bugging equipment. Bearing in mind the Royal family has protection officers, I wouldn't have thought they could be followed around with a lot of equipment."Another point is that our company sells military encryption devices for mobile phones that cost about £1,000 a phone. I would be very surprised if the Royal Family are not using that type of technology, but whoever you are speaking to would have to have the same level of encryption."Charles would have to make sure Camilla also had an encrypted phone.

"It is also quite possible the royal staff had not protected their voicemails with PIN numbers, making it easy for anybody to access them."Peter Heims, a private investigator and editor of Investigate, the official magazine of the association of British Investigators, said the News of the World would have access to high tech equipment.He said: "The News of the World would have the most sophisticated equipment.

"The majority of bugging does not get discovered. If it is in a company it is not broadcast because they don't want clients to know. They cost whatever you are prepared to pay."The loss of confidence in the company could affect the share price.Because mobile phone signals are carried in the air once they leave the phone, there is no way of knowing if one is being bugged.Mr Marks said: "There is no way of telling if a mobile phone is being bugged. The signal floats in the air until it gets to the target. It's not like a landline where you can put a bug on the cables."Bugging is much easier on landlines because you just have to put a transmitter on the phone line inside or outside.

"It doesn't necessarily have to be on the property, but I would be most surprised if the Royal Family did not sweep for bugs, which costs from £500 to £5000 depending on the size of the property."Clive Goodman and the other two were taken into custody at 9.30am yesterday in Putney and Sutton, South London

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Wiretap Scandal: Vodafone, Ericsson at odds
Athens(Greece), AP

A parliament committee is investigating the illegal cell phone surveillance of Premier Costas Caramanlis' and senior state security officials from just before the August 2004 Olympic Games until March 2005.

The head of Ericsson's operations in Greece has disputed an account given by telecom giant Vodafone about a major wiretapping scandal that included illegal surveillance of the country's prime minister.

The list also included senior military officers, human rights activists, journalists, Arab businessmen and a mobile phone used by the US Embassy, according to a list of numbers given to parliament by Vodafone.

Victims of the wiretap operation were subscribers of Vodafone, which uses technology built by the Swedish telecoms equipment maker Ericsson to maintain its Greek network.

Ericsson's CEO in Greece, Bill Zikou, told parliament yesterday that software it installed in the network to allow legally-sanctioned surveillance had been exploited by a rogue programme to tap government phones.

Zikou maintained Vodafone had been informed about that legal software and had been responsible for its protection - a claim strongly denied by the British mobile phone operator.

"Ericsson provided the customer with full details and informative documents, noting that the new software package included software components for lawful interception," Zikou told parliament, according to a statement released in Greek by Ericsson.

But a Vodafone statement issued after Zikou's appearance said it had not been informed about the surveillance software.

Is Wiretapping Possible for Cell Phones?

With the whole nation absorbed in a wiretapping scandal involving the nation’s spy agency in 1997, a question is arising in many people’s minds: Can cell phones be bugged?

Experts say bugging today’s digital mobile handsets is practically impossible although there are several theoretical routes to do so, which might lead to future cell phone wiretapping problems.

"Analogue phones used in the 1990s were prone to wiretapping but current digital handsets are dramatically less vulnerable to it,’’ said Lee Hyuck-jae, a professor at Information and Communication University.

"I do not think any law enforcement agencies of Korea presently have the ability to easily overhear mobile calls. Even if they channel loads of funds into developing such facilities, they would not get satisfactory results.’’

Eavesdropping on wireless phones typically implies intercepting radio signals carried from and to cell phones and converting them back into sound to listen to the call.

"Under the previous analogue technologies, eavesdroppers could overhear mobile calls as soon as they captured radio waves, which carried a voice directly. But now things are different,’’ Lee said.

Korea’s current digital mobile system of the code division multiple access (CDMA) encrypts all phone calls or messages into computer bits. As a result, what eavesdroppers get is only computer gibberish not voices.

To read the signals, the digital computer bits should be deciphered into voices, a job that can be done only by using expensive, high-tech machines.

"If you want to wiretap mobile calls, you should be equipped with large-sized devices to intercept radio signals and chase a target to keep capturing them. In addition, several experts need to decipher the signals and they might not guarantee results. Is this a practical technology?’’ Lee asked.

Other Ways to Wiretap Cell Phones

Pohang University of Science and Technology professor Lee Phil-joong points out there are routes to wiretap cell phones other than intercepting radio signals.

He says phone taps are possible at the mobile operators’ servers, or on a fixed-line section that carries encrypted voice data for wireless communication.

When a person makes a call on his cell phone, his voice is digitized and sent to the nearest base station that then tosses it to another base station adjacent to the recipient’s via the mobile carrier’s switch operators.

Between the base stations, transmission of voice data is carried out on landlines exactly like that of fixed-line phone calls.

"If mobile calls are overheard over the landline connection segment, wireless phones are no different from normal phones that are vulnerable to wiretapping,’’ Lee said.

Operating under that belief, Lee’s team developed a bugging-free phone in 2003 in collaboration with Pantech Group, the nation’s third-largest mobile handset maker.

The model, which failed to hit the stores for some reason, encrypts voice signals in a unique fashion in addition to CDMA’s general encoding process.

Yet, Lee of Information and Communication University says illegal surveillance on CDMA does not make sense since it is impossible to tap fixed-line sections under the network system of Korea.

"Even if the court gives a green light to the police to wiretap the fixed-line section, they will not. To do so, mobile carrier must overhaul their networks. But they don’t have any reason to spend money in an area that will not yield any profits.’’

Lee added that in the United States the federal government funds changes in the network enabling law enforcement officers to sort specific data in the fixed-line section.

KTF, Korea’s runner-up wireless operator, concurs.

``We can know who are on line with their mobile handsets by checking the fixed line. But we cannot single out the line carrying their talks,’’ a KTF official said.

Feds Seek Wiretap Access for Mobile Calls on Planes
DOJ calls for built-in terrorism-fighting features if cell phones allowed in flight.

Computerworld

If cell phones and other handheld wireless devices are allowed to be used on aircraft by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice wants built-in terrorism-fighting capabilities to allow fast wiretaps and quick ways to disconnect conversations between terrorists.

A Need to Monitor?

In the brief, the DOJ officials said they support efficient use of wireless services, but they want to be sure the government can monitor criminal and terrorist activities. DOJ officials also said that if cell phone use is permitted on airplanes, they want to make sure law enforcement authorities can quickly intercept suspected terrorist communications by cell phone or onboard Internet access.

"The Departments believe that the timely roll-out of new commercial airborne communications capabilities can be accomplished in a responsible manner...which both encourages and rewards private sector investment and expedited development, while addressing the Departments' public safety and national security concerns," the brief said. "The Departments support such an approach, which will benefit not just the flying public but will lend significant support to the vital mission of law enforcement onboard 'at risk' flights and, in that respect, can be viewed as a critical factor in enhancing the safety of those flights."

A 1994 law, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, allows law enforcement officials to keep pace with changes in communications technology as they monitor illegal and terrorist activities, according to the DOJ. The agencies want to be sure that any changes in airborne cell phone use and Internet access comply with the act so law enforcement officials can maintain tapping and interception capabilities.

"They want to have the ability to shut off the system if need be," said Chris Brown, counsel for the House Aviation Subcommittee.

Even if the FCC agrees to allow cell phone use on airplanes sometime next year, he said, the Federal Aviation Administration has said it has no plans to lift its ban on their use. The FAA has, however, said that it will consider such technology issues on a case-by-case basis. If both agencies were to okay the proposed change, a final decision on whether to allow cell phone use would then fall to the individual airlines, Brown said.

Wiretap in Ten Minutes

The DOJ in its comments suggested that it be given the authority to tap an airborne cell phone conversation within a 10-minute time frame if the phones are allowed to be used on planes.

"There is no room for such uncertainty in the air-to-ground context, where delays of minutes and seconds could make the difference between life and death for passengers and crew aloft and those on the ground below," the DOJ officials said. "There is a short window of opportunity in which action can be taken to thwart a suicidal terrorist hijacking or remedy other crisis situations onboard an aircraft, and law enforcement needs to maximize its ability to respond to these potentially lethal situations."

The DOJ officials said they also want to prevent terrorists and other criminals from being able to use cell phones or onboard Internet access to coordinate a hijacking or attack by retaining the ability to intercept communications. The DOJ said it would be helpful if investigators could quickly locate and identify all cell phone users on a plane, interrupt communications if necessary, conference law enforcement officials into any communications, and cut off all broadband-enabled communications devices.

The DOJ also warned the FCC that terrorists could use cell phones as remote-controlled improvised explosive devices in the air.

To fight that possibility, the DOJ wants onboard cell-phone users to be authenticated to the onboard network and register their locations on the aircraft before being able to use their devices. The DOJ also wants "strong network security controls required of communications equipment onboard aircraft" and wants communications companies to provide a way that will deny network access and connectivity to any device stored in an airplane's cargo hold so a bomb can't be activated.

The DOJ comments are among some 7800 received so far by the FCC on the airborne cell phone proposal. Comments will be accepted by the agency through August 11.

Snapshield Announces Snapsoft: - A Breakthrough in Voice Security.
Business Wire | San Francisco,CA,USA

VIENNA, Va. - Jan. 18, 2005 - SNAPSHIELD, continuing its proud tradition of designing innovative, flexible and cost-effective secure communication solutions, announced today the commercial launch of Snapsoft(TM), a voice encryption solution for GSM-based Smartphones.

Snapsoft(TM), available as a software download for Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) Smartphones, is completely unobtrusive, eliminating the need for a hardware dongle or dedicated handset.

Snapsoft(TM) takes advantage of the increased processing power available in today's Smartphones, providing a high performance secure voice solution with minimal voice latency. Snapsoft(TM) is aimed at the rapidly growing Smartphone market, which is expected to reach 28 million units in 2005 and to grow to 150 million by 2008.

Snapsoft(TM) is currently available for Smartphones based on Windows Mobile operating system. Versions for other popular operating systems, such as Symbian, Palm and Blackberry, are scheduled for release throughout 2005.

Snapsoft(TM) is fully integrated into the Snapzone(TM), Snapcorp(TM) and Snapshield(TM) Enterprise offerings, so that customers can take advantage of Snapshield's patented point-to-multipoint voice encryption technology as well as its advanced management and central control features.

Commenting on the release of Snapsoft(TM), Shimon Zigdon, Snapshield CEO, said, "The release of Snapsoft(TM) continues the tradition of Snapcell(TM) and Snapfone(TM) by offering the highest level of voice security for standard telecommunications products."

About Snapzone(TM), Snapcorp(TM) and Snapshield(TM)
Snapshield's end-to-end total telephony security solutions create safe communication zones, providing large and small organizations with the most effective protection for voice and fax communications using private or public telephone infrastructure. Each deployment delivers cutting edge military-grade security and is fully scalable, supporting any number of telephone numbers. The solution involves connecting state of-the-art encryption/decryption terminals including Snapfone(TM) for fixed lines, Snapcell(TM)/Snapsoft(TM) for mobile phones and Snaptrunk(TM) for ISDN/PRI trunks. The Snapshield(TM) Enterprise solution also includes management software that enables administrators to easily configure, update and manage security policies of networked devices from a central location.

About Snapshield

Founded in 1996, Snapshield is a leading global provider of affordable end-to-end security solutions for converged wireless, wireline and network of the future (including 2.5, 3G and IP). Snapshield's patented technology delivers standards-based encryption, authentication and key management technology that protects telecom users against eavesdropping, and the theft of sensitive information. Snapshield solutions are currently deployed in over 30 countries protecting sensitive information for government agencies, military units and corporate networks.